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Abstract—In this work, we investigate the physical layer
security (PHYLS) performance of full-duplex (FD) cellular
networks, where the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) occur
over the same radio-frequency (RF) resources. Here, the
locations of the base stations (BSs) and mobile terminals
(MTs) are drawn from stationary Poisson point processes
(PPPs). Moreover, the eavesdroppers (EDs) locations are
unknown to the network, and are thus modeled from an in-
dependent PPP. We characterize the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) distributions at the reference BS,
MT, and most malicious EDs. Accordingly, we develop
explicit expressions for the secrecy rates in both UL and
DL of the FD cellular network under consideration. Our
finding show that the choice of FD versus HD operation, in
addition to improving the spectral efficiency, can enhance
the secrecy rate, particularly for ultra-dense deployments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular networks have become increasingly dense in
order to account for the rapid rise in mobile data traffic.
Due to the broadcasting nature of wireless mediums,
such networks have become more vulnerable to mali-
cious listeners, rendering security an essential design
criteria [1]. Conventionally, security measures have been
implemented through the higher layers of the protocol
stack using cryptographic authentication [2]. However,
this approach introduces many challenges such as high
cost and vulnerability to attacks [3], [4].
In order to overcome the aforementioned challenges,
physical layer security (PHYLS) has emerged as an
additional security measure to transmit data confiden-
tially. Originally, Wyner presented the application of
wiretrap channel for secrecy rate of a point-to-point com-
munication channel [5]. Later on, Csiszar and Korner
extended this work to broadcast channels transmitting
both common and confidential messages [6]. According
to these works, the secrecy rate can be guaranteed when
the legitimate receiver enjoys a better channel than a
potential eavesdropper (ED).
In the recent years, many works have analyzed the
PHYLS performance in different wireless networks, such
as the study of the achievable secrecy rate in the presence
of artificial noise [7], relay wiretap channel [8], and with
colluding EDs [9], [10]. Most works in the literature,
however, study conventional half-duplex (HD) systems.
With increasing number of users and data rate demands,
full-duplex (FD) wireless communications, has become
a topic of interest [11]. In FD systems, the downlink
(DL) and (UL) occur over the same radio-frequency (RF)
resources, hence, the spectral efficiency performance can
be improved depending on the severity of the added
interference [12], [13].
Motivated by the above, in this work, we study the
PHYLS performance of a FD cellular network. We
define the system parameters, intended signals, inter-
ference terms, and received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) distributions for each part of the
network. Consequently, we derive the received rate for
each element, and in turn the secrecy rate for both
UL and DL modes of communications. By utilizing
the proposed framework and with the aid of numerical
simulations, we draw network design insights, including
depicting the specific scenarios in which the FD mode
of communications may improve the secrecy rate versus
its HD counterpart.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider a FD cellular network where
the base stations (BSs) and mobile terminals (MTs) are
deployed according to independent stationary Poisson
point processes (PPPs) φs and φm with spatial densities
λs and λm, respectively. The locations of the EDs are
not known to the network, therefore in this work, they
are modelled according to a PPP φf with spatial density
λf [14]. Moreover, the EDs are considered to operate
independently which means they do not exchange their
observations [9], [15].
Based on the Slivnyak-Mecke theorem [16], we per-
form the DL analysis for a typical MT o considered
to be located at the center. Let l ∈ φs, k ∈ φm, and
j ∈ φf denote the locations of the BS l, MT k, and ED j,
respectively. We consider the cellular association strategy
based on the maximum received SINR under global
frequency reuse [17]. For single-tier deployments, this
is equivalent to cellular association based on the closest978-1-5386-3531-5/17/$31.00 c© 2017 IEEE






, l ∈ φs (1)
where b, ‖.‖ and α (> 2) denote the tagged BS,
Euclidean distance, and path-loss exponent, respectively.
The UL analysis, on the other hand, is performed at the
tagged BS b.
Let ps and pm denote the BS and MT (fixed) transmit
powers, respectively. The DL channel power gains from
the BS l at the MT k and ED j are hl,k and hl,j ,
respectively. Further, we denote the UL channel power
gains from the MT k at the BS l and ED j using gk,l and
gk,j , respectively. The cross-mode channel power gains
from the BS l at the BS b, and from the MT k at the
MT o are represented using hl,b and gk,o, respectively. In
addition, in the order given, the loop-back interference
(LI) at the BS l and MT k are represented using
hl,l and gk,k. All channels are considered to undergo
independent Rayleigh fading. Moreover, additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ2 is considered
at all receivers.
It should be noted that due to the cellular association
process, the scheduled MTs are inherently correlated
[18]. Here, conditioning on the spatial constraints, we
assume that the set of scheduled MTs follows from an
independent stationary PPP [19]. Further, we consider
the most malicious ED which receives the strongest
SINR and dominates other EDs [20].























Io,o = pmgo,o. (6)




















Ib,b = pshb,b. (11)





















On the other side, the SINR in the UL at the most
malicious ED c is given by
γc =
Xc


















Note that, due to the passivity of the EDs, there is no
LI at the ED side.
III. ANALYSIS
Considering the parameters defined in the previous
section, we may calculate the average rate through the
following expression [21]







where Fγ(x) denotes the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of the received SINR γ. We start by studying
the average rates in the DL as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Fγo(x) and Fγe(x) denote the CDF
of received SINR at the intended MT o and the most ma-
licious ED e in the DL, respectively. The corresponding
average rates from the reference BS b, at the intended
user o and the most malicious ED e are represented by

























































Proof: See Appendix A.
In the next step, we calculate the average rates in the
UL.
Theorem 2. Let Fγb(x) and Fγc(x) denote the CDF
of the received SINR at the intended BS b and the most
malicious ED c in the UL, respectively. The correspond-
ing average rates at the intended BS b and the most
malicious ED c are represented by Cγb and Cγc , and

























































Proof: See Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, and ap-
plying the Jensen’s inequality, E{max(X,Y )} ≥
max{E{X},E{Y }}, we can calculate the DL average
secrecy rate at the reference MT by [9], [22]
SDL = [Cγo − Cγe ]+ (25)
where [x]+ =max{x, 0} represents the fact that the
secrecy rate is lower bounded. Moreover, the UL average
secrecy rate at the reference BS is given by
SUL = [Cγb − Cγc ]+ . (26)
Remark. According to Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 and equations (25) and (26) we can observe that
increasing the spatial density of BSs improves the DL
and UL secrecy rates. Furthermore, we note that the
FD over HD secrecy rate gain increases with greater
BS deployment density and with having a less populated
ED field. In such cases, the inherent trade-off between
higher spatial reuse versus added interference is more
favourable, hence, the FD system achieves a higher
secrecy rate gain over its HD counterpart.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we present numerical examples in order to
assess the PHYLS performance of FD versus HD cellular
networks for different settings of system parameters.
Specifically, we study the impact of BSs and EDs spatial
densities on the corresponding secrecy rate gain within
a two-time-slot period. The noise power is assumed
to be zero and the path loss exponent is set to three.
Moreover, the maximum transmit powers of base station
and mobile terminals are taken to be 30 dBm and 23
dBm, respectively. Moreover, we take into account the
case in which the receivers possess arbitrary interference
cancelation capability. Specifically, each receiver is ca-
pable of suppressing the cross-mode interference within
a radius of ζ [23].
First, we investigate the impact of EDs spatial density
on the FD versus HD secrecy rate gain. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, by increasing the density of EDs, the correspond-
ing gain decreases. However, this drop is negligible up to
an approximate density of 10−3. Therefore, despite the
increase in the population of EDs up to a certain point,
by means of an advanced receiver, a significant increased
secrecy rate of over 23% is achievable. We consider this
critical point for our following example.
Next, we study the effect of different BS spatial
densities in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the BS deployment
density has a profound impact on the corresponding
FD over HD secrecy rate gain. Specifically, for dense
cellular environments, the FD system offers a better
PHYL performance than one which is operating in HD
mode. Moreover, with advanced interference mitigation
strategies, the FD technology facilitates an increase of
more than 20% in secrecy rate in comparison to a HD
system. This outcome is particularly interesting with the
emergence of ultra-dense cellular setups.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied the PHYLS performance in
a FD cellular network. The BSs, MTs, and EDs were
modeled according to the PPP-based abstraction model.
We derived explicit expressions for the secrecy rate in
the DL and UL. The proposed framework was utilized to
study the FD versus HD secrecy rate gain. Our findings
indicated that the FD operation allows for significant
improvements in the secrecy rate, particularly for ultra-
dense deployments.

























Fig. 1. Impact of EDs density on the FD versus HD secrecy rate gain.
System parameters are: λs = 10−4, ps = 30 dBm, pm = 23 dBm,
α = 3.
VI. APPENDIX A
The CDF of received SINR at the intended user in the
DL conditioned on rb,o = r is given by































The probability density function (PDF) of the
transmitter-receiver distance under the max-SINR
cellular association strategy is given by
Prb,o(r) = 2piλsr exp
(−piλsr2) . (28)
Hence, we can arrive at (21).
The CDF of received SINR at the most malicious ED
in the DL Fγe(x) is given by





















Td,d + Tu,d + σ2
< x | φf
) .
(29)























Fig. 2. Impact of BSs density on FD versus HD secrecy rate gain.
System parameters are: λf = 10−4, ps = 30 dBm, pm = 23 dBm,
α = 3.
By employing the probability generating functional
(PGFL) of a PPP and converting from Cartesian to polar
























































































Hence, we arrive at (22).
VII. APPENDIX B
Using a similar approach to that in Appendix A, the
corresponding intended and eavesdropping SINRs in the












































Hence, we arrive at (23) and (24).
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